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RASUL V. BUSH: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Randolph N. Jonakait*
INTRODUCTION
Of the three recent Supreme Court cases concerning enemy combatants, Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld,' Rasul v. Bush,2 and Rumsfeld v. Padilla,3 Rasul is the case that will
affect the most people and most affect future governmental operations. Hamdi and
Padilla concern citizens who have been classified as enemy combatants by President
Bush. Those cases consider important procedural and constitutional issues but leave
much to be decided by future courts. Those issues are significant and worthy of
debate,4 but in a practical sense, the reach of the two decisions will be limited. As
far as we know, only two citizens have been detained as enemy combatants, and it
is doubtful that legions of citizens will be incarcerated as enemy combatants in the
future. While the issues in those two cases, both addressed and unanswered, are
important, not many people will be directly affected by their resolution.
Rasul, on the other hand, concluded that American courts have jurisdiction to
decide habeas corpus petitions from aliens detained at the U.S. naval base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.5 This decision has an immediate, significant impact be-
cause it affects the hundreds of aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay, but its potential
reach is much broader. Rasul's reasoning seems to allow anyone, alien or citizen,
* Professor, New York Law School. A.B., Princeton University, 1967; J.D., University
of Chicago, 1970; LL.M., New York University, 1971. The author thanks Donald Zeigler,
Stephen Newman, Martin Morris, and Arminda Bepko for their assistance.
124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
2 124 S. Ct. 2686 (204).
3 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
4 Hamdi, without a majority opinion, indicates that a citizen who has actively taken up
arms against the United States can be held as an enemy combatant but is entitled to due
process in the designation process. The plurality suggested what might be labeled "innovative
forms of due process" that could satisfy the Constitution, but it left to lower courts the task
of finding what procedures will actually satisfy due process. See infra Part II.A.
Padilla dismissed the habeas petition because the petitioner named the wrong respon-
dents and filed it in the wrong district court. Because of this dismissal, the Court did not have
to address how the executive branch must treat a citizen like Padilla who it labels an enemy
combatant, and who was not captured while armed in a zone of battle, but arrested in the
United States. Courts will have to confront this issue if the petition is properly re-filed. See
infra Part II.E.
Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686.
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detained by the United States to challenge the legality of his detention by a habeas
corpus petition in American courts. If so, not only are many people affected now,
many others who might be detained by the United States as a result of military or
other governmental actions will be affected in the future.
Whether Rasul really grants this broad right to habeas corpus is a question that
lower courts will have to address, but there are many other issues about the possible
substance of habeas corpus claims from aliens detained as enemy combatants that
lower courts will also have to confront. Rasul did not address these issues, but they
present crucial and difficult questions. Constitutional doctrine states that aliens
outside American territories do not have rights under the U.S. Constitution. What
valid grounds, if any, then, are there for enemy-combatant aliens abroad to claim
that their detentions by the United States are illegal?
This Article will explore various questions not answered by Rasul. Answers,
however, will be few because many of those questions have seldom, if ever, been
presented to the courts. Instead, the real legacy of Rasul may be an opened door
into uncharted legal areas.
Part I of this Article discusses federal court jurisdiction of habeas corpus peti-
tions from aliens detained abroad as enemy combatants. While Rasul could have
limited habeas jurisdiction to aliens detained on Guantanamo Bay because the naval
base there is, in essence, U.S. territory, the Court's decision went further and grants
jurisdiction to aliens held by the United States anywhere in the world.
Part II discusses the question of what substantive claims aliens can make in
their habeas petitions. Because aliens not in the United States generally do not have
rights under the U.S. Constitution, possible claims are not clear and will raise diffi-
cult issues that have not been squarely addressed by the courts.
1. JURISDICTION OF THE HABEAS PETITIONS
A. Background
Shortly after the al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed a
joint resolution, "Authorization for Use of Military Force."6 Its operative language
states:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or per-
sons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or har-
bored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
6 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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future acts of international terrorism against the United States
by such nations, organizations or persons.7
Subsequently, President Bush sent U.S. military forces into Afghanistan for a
campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban, which controlled that country and
supported the terrorist group.
During that military action, U.S. forces took into custody over 600 people who
were transferred to and incarcerated at the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba. Fourteen of those prisoners, two Australian and a dozen Kuwaiti citizens,
held since early in 2002 and claiming that they had not taken part in hostilities
against the United States, brought actions in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia challenging the legality of their detention at Guantanamo.8 The district
court construed all the actions as petitions for writs of habeas corpus but, relying
on Johnson v. Eisentrager,9 dismissed them for want of jurisdiction.' ° The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, also relying on Eisentrager,
affirmed the dismissals." The Supreme Court, in Rasul v. Bush,' 2 reversed and
remanded to the district court for consideration of the legality of the petitioners'
detentions.
B. Johnson v. Eisentrager"
Johnson v. Eisentrager, decided in the aftermath of World War 1H, considered
the habeas corpus petitions of twenty-one German nationals that had been filed in
the District Court for the District of Columbia. 4 Military tribunals had convicted
the petitioners of violating the laws of war by continuing military activities against
the United States in China after Germany had unconditionally surrendered. 5 The
trials were held in China, and the resulting sentences were approved by a military
reviewing authority. The petitioners were then brought to Germany to serve their
sentences in the Landsberg Prison.'6
7 id.
8 Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002), affd sub nom., Al Odah v. United
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
9 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
't Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
12 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
"3 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
'4 Id. at 765.
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The Court held that the petitioners did not have a constitutional right to have
a U.S. court consider their habeas petitions. 7 Eisentrager noted the rights of an
alien increased "as he increases his identity with our society., 8 These rights,
however, are dependent upon the alien being present in American territory. "In
extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at
pains to point out that it was the alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction
that gave the Judiciary power to act."' 9 The petitioners did not have the requisite
presence in America to give them constitutional rights. "These prisoners at no
relevant time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign,
and the scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were
all beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.""0 Conse-
quently, they did not have a constitutional right to have American courts consider
their habeas petitions.
In contrast, Rasul v. Bush held that American courts must consider the habeas
corpus petitions of the aliens detained as enemy combatants in Guantanamo Bay.2'
Rasul gave a number of different reasons why Eisentrager did not control its
outcome. The true reason for the decision is significant, however, because the
extent of habeas corpus jurisdiction depends on which rationale controls.2
C. Limiting Eisentrager to Its Facts
Perhaps Rasul limited Eisentrager to its facts. Eisentrager stated:
To support that assumption [of a constitutional right to habeas
jurisdiction] we must hold that a prisoner of our military
'7 See id. at 777 (noting the petitioners' "basic premise is that these prisoners are entitled,
as a constitutional right, to sue in some court of the United States for a writ of habeas
corpus").
'8 Id. at 770.
19Id. at 771.
2I Id. at 778. In distinguishing another decision coming out of World War II, In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), where the Court did adjudicate a habeas petition, Eisentrager
stressed that the petitioners had an American presence. Yamashita, a Japanese general, was
convicted of war crimes by a military tribunal in the Philippines for actions committed there.
The United States then had sovereign control over that land, and Eisentrager stated:
By reason of our sovereignty at that time over these insular posses-
sions .... Yamashita's offenses were committed on our territory, he
was tried within the jurisdiction of our insular courts and he was
imprisoned within territory of the United States. None of these heads
of jurisdiction can be invoked by these prisoners.
Id. at 780.
2 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686.
22 See infra Parts I.C-F.
1132
RASUL V. BUSH: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
authorities is constitutionally entitled to the writ, even though he
(a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United
States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held
in military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and con-
victed by a Military Commission sitting outside the United
States;... (f) and is at all times imprisoned outside the United
States.23
Rasul, citing this passage, stated, "On this set of facts, [Eisentrager] concluded, 'no
right to the writ of habeas corpus appears."' 24
Of course, if all those facts have to be present for Eisentrager to control and for
courts not to have jurisdiction of habeas petitions from aliens abroad, the reach of
that case is small, for seldom would those six factors be conjoined. Rasul, however,
did not explicitly limit the previous case to those facts, but did stress how the
Guantanamo detainees differed from the earlier petitioners:
They are not nationals of countries at war with the United
States, and they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts
of aggression against the United States; they have never been
afforded access to any tribunal, much less charged with and
convicted of wrongdoing; and for more than two years they have
been imprisoned in territory over which the United States
exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control."
Some of these distinguishing factors' importance to habeas jurisdiction is not
obvious. Whether the detainees had access to a tribunal or were charged seem to
be issues related to the substance of a habeas petition; that is, whether rights were
abrogated, not whether a court has the authority to consider whether rights were
violated. Thus, if a court has jurisdiction, it might consider whether detainees had
access to lawful tribunals to litigate their claims to determine whether their
detention is legal, but that issue does not seem to affect whether the court had
jurisdiction in the first place. Ifit does make ajurisdictional difference, Rasul does
23 339 U.S. at 777.
24 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2693 (2004) (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 781). Rasul, at this
point, plays fast and loose with the earlier case. Nowhere does Eisentrager suggest that these
were the six crucial facts of its decision, if by crucial facts it means that the conjunction of
all six were necessary for its decision. Instead, more fairly read, Eisentrager concluded that
existing precedents denied aliens without a presence in the United States the right to seek
habeas corpus in American courts. 339 U.S. at 763. The Court listed the factors to illustrate
how unusual it would have been to ignore or overrule those precedents to grant these
particular petitioners access to the courts. See id.
25 124 S. Ct. at 2693.
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not explain why. Similarly, whether or not the detainees deny being enemy comba-
tants might say something about whether their classification as enemy combatants
is correct, but this fact does not appear to be an issue that affects whether the
judiciary can hear claims of their detention's illegality. Once again, if it does, the
Court did not explain why.
On the other hand, whether or not a detainee is a national of a country at war
with the United States might seem to be a distinction that could affect jurisdiction.
Perhaps aliens from hostile countries should not be granted as many rights in U.S.
courts as other aliens. But Rasul does not really seem to intend for this distinction
to have significance. Elsewhere, Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court stresses
that the habeas statute makes no distinction between aliens and citizens.26 That
statute also draws no distinction between aliens from hostile countries and aliens
from non-hostile countries. If that statutory language indicates that courts should
not treat citizens and aliens differently forjurisdictional issues, then it also indicates
that a court should not draw distinctions among aliens for jurisdictional purposes.
Furthermore, if only nationals of hostile countries were barred from seeking
habeas corpus, it would not prevent anyone detained as an enemy combatant in our
Afghanistan action from having access to the courts. We were not fighting a
country, but al Qaeda and its supporter, the Taliban. The United States, like most
of the world, did not recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of
Afghanistan.27 A detainee could be a national of Afghanistan, but a person could
not be a "national" of the Taliban or of al Qaeda. No one detained because of the
Afghanistan action is a national of a country at war with the.United States.28
Indeed, the courts are not independently able to determine who the "enemy" is
in the military actions authorized in the wake of September 11. The operative lan-
guage of the joint resolution authorizes "force against those nations, organizations
or persons," that the president determines were involved in the 2001 attacks.29 This
26 See infra Part I.E.
21 See Juan R. Torruella, On the Slippery Slopes of Afghanistan: Military Commissions
and the Exercise of Presidential Power, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 648, 693 (2002) ("[Tlhe
Taliban regime was refused diplomatic recognition by most of the international community,
including the United States, as well as denied a seat in the United Nations. It was, however,
accredited by the governments of Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.").
28 See JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORTFOR CONGRESS: TERRORISM AND
THE LAW OF WAR: TRYING TERRORISTS AS WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE MILITARY COMMISSIONS
4 (2001) ("Because the current state of hostilities does not involve an enemy foreign state as
such, the status of an alien as an 'enemy alien' cannot be determined according to citizen-
ship."), available at http:/fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/7951 .pdf; see also 50 U.S.C.
§ 21 (2000) (defining "enemy aliens" as "all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the
hostile nation or government ... who shall be within the United States and not actually
naturalized").
29 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40 § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001).
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authorization did not define the enemy. It simply ceded the determination of the foe
to the president." The enemy is anyone the President determines to have been
involved in the September 11 attacks and those who supported the attackers. While
that seems to include al Qaeda, it is not limited to that group. It includes the
Taliban, a non-national group that harbored al Qaeda, but it could also include many
more nations, organizations, or individuals that the public, and the judiciary, do not
know about. The foes do not have to be publicly announced; indeed, we can expect
the president to authorize clandestine operations based on information not available
to the rest of us. The identity of the enemy is changeable and simply not known
outside the executive branch, and thus whether an alien is a national of a country at
war with us cannot be a useful factor for determining habeas corpus jurisdiction for
those detained at Guantanamo or elsewhere in the wake of September 11.31
While most of the factors that Rasul listed to distinguish Eisentrager do not
seem as if they could affect jurisdiction, the last factor listed, the special status of
Guanatanamo Bay, could.
D. The Special Status of Guantanamo Bay
The United States occupies Guantanamo Bay under a 1903 lease with Cuba that
remains in effect as long as the United States maintains a naval base there, which
30 John Ely noted that congressional authorizations for war may not have to take a
specific form, but that the congressional action must
ordinarily be specific in terms of who it is we're prepared to go to war
against - that is, that it not be a wholesale delegation of authority to
the president to make war against whomever he regards as a suitable
foe. Unlike most of the provisions of Article I, section 8, the War
Clause speaks of a "declaration" - signaling a specific designation -
not in terms that comfortably encompass a grant of general legislative
discretion to the executive.... Whatever historical variation there may
have been in declarations of war, "Go to war against whomever you
want" would not have counted. The War Clause means only two things,
but they are something: that Congress is to decide whether we go to
war, and whom we go to war against.
JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTnTTONAL LEsSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS
AFrERMATH 26 (1993).
31 Of course, when a president initiates an undeclared war, Congress has not decided
against whom we are battling. But at least when such a war is openly carried out, we have a
good idea of the foe's identity. When we invaded Iraq, an enemy was one fighting for the
Iraqi regime. When we invaded Grenada, an enemy was one fighting for the Grenadian
regime. The military action in response to September 11, even as authorized by Congress,
is different. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1033
(2004) ("[Alnybody can be suspected of complicity with al Qaeda. This means that all of us
are, in principle, subject to executive detention once we treat the 'war on terrorism' as if it
were the legal equivalent of [World War II].").
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means in perpetuity if the United States so desires. The lease recognizes the
"ultimate sovereignty" of Cuba over the land but also grants the United States
"complete jurisdiction and control over and within" the area.32 Rasul stated:
Whatever traction the presumption against extraterritoriality
might have in other contexts, it certainly has no application to
the operation of the habeas statute with respect to persons
detained within "the territorial jurisdiction" of the United States.
By the express terms of its agreements with Cuba, the United
States exercises "complete jurisdiction and control" over the
Guantanamo Bay naval base, and may continue to exercise such
control permanently if it so chooses.33
If federal courts have jurisdiction over the habeas petitions because
Guantanamo is virtually American territory where aliens have the same rights as
they do in the United States, habeas corpus petitions should also be allowed from
anyone held in American custody wherever the United States has complete
jurisdiction and control over territory that is not formally American. Lower courts
would then have to decide where, besides Guantanamo Bay, we have the qualifying
"complete jurisdiction and control" that justifies habeas jurisdiction.
While Rasul clearly indicates that the necessary status can come from a formal
document that specifies it, as the lease with Cuba does, other questions will arise.
Can a foreign country grant the United States such status through other terms? If
so, what terms? Does such status have to be formally given by another country, or
can it occur by other means? Perhaps most important, can military action produce
such status? Certainly de facto it has, as Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in
Rasul,joined in by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, pointed out. Scalia
concluded that the American status in Guantanamo "is no different in effect from
'jurisdiction and control' acquired by lawful force of arms, [and] parts of
Afghanistan and Iraq should logically be regarded as subject to our domestic
laws."' Lower courts will have to determine if military control over foreign
territory is the equivalent of Guantanamo's status - a decision courts seem ill-
equipped to make - if that status was the determining factor in giving courts
habeas corpus jurisdiction. Courts, however, may be freed from these determi-
nations because Rasul also indicates that the special status of Guantanamo Bay was
32 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690-91 (quoting Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations,
Feb. 16-23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, art. III, T.S. No. 418).
" Id. at 2696 (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); Lease of
Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations, supra note 32, at art. III) (citation omitted).
3 Id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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not the determining factor for finding that American courts had jurisdiction over the
habeas corpus petitions from the aliens detained at the base. 5
E. Treating Aliens and Citizens the Same for Habeas Jurisdiction
Immediately after stressing the extraordinary terms of the Guantanamo lease,
Justice Stevens's opinion noted that the President had conceded that American
courts had habeas jurisdiction over citizens held at Guantanamo.36 The Court
continued:
Considering that the [habeas] statute [(28 U.S.C. § 2241)] draws
no distinction between Americans and aliens held in federal
custody, there is little reason to think that Congress intended the
geographical coverage of the statute to vary depending on the
detainee's citizenship. Aliens held at the base, no less than
American citizens, are entitled to invoke the federal courts'
authority under § 2241."
The conclusion that the statute makes no jurisdictional distinction between
citizens and aliens, and therefore aliens are entitled to have their habeas claims
heard if comparably situated citizens have that right, is a non sequitur to the
discussion of the special status of Guantanamo Bay. The Court has never held that
a citizen in American custody abroad is entitled to habeas relief only if the place of
confinement is controlled by the United States in the same manner that the United
States controls Guantanamo Bay. Indeed, the Court has granted habeas corpus
relief to a citizen held in American custody outside U.S. territory without consider-
ing whether the United States had complete jurisdiction and control over the place
where the citizen was detained.38 If Rasul held that there is federal court juris-
diction over an alien's habeas claim whenever a citizen in custody in like
circumstances is entitled to federal court access, then the crucial question is not
whether the United States has complete control over the place of detention but
simply whether a citizen could seek habeas relief in the alien's circumstances.39
35 Id.
36 Id. at 2696 ("Respondents themselves concede that the habeas statute would create
federal-court jurisdiction over the claims of an American citizen held at the base.").
37 Id. (footnote omitted).
38 See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (granting habeas corpus
relief to a court-martial convict held in Korea).
" Justice Scalia, dissenting, concluded that the portion of the Court's opinion "dealing
with the status of Guantanamo Bay[] is a puzzlement.... [T]he status of Guantanamo Bay
is entirely irrelevant to the issue here." 124 S. Ct. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia observed that the Court had already concluded that habeas corpus could be extended
2005]
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Finally, Rasul indicated that Eisentrager did not control, not because of the
status of Guantanamo, but because interpretation of the habeas corpus statute had
changed since the World War II era.
40
F. Constitutional Versus Statutory Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction
Rasul stressed that Eisentrager, while concluding that the detainees had no
constitutional right to a habeas corpus petition, said nothing about the statutory right
to the writ other than to conclude that the habeas statute did not grant the detainees
a right to petition.4' The statute did not then authorize jurisdiction, according to
Rasul, because of the Court's earlier decision in Ahrens v. Clark.42 In Ahrens,
detainees on Ellis Island had filed habeas petitions in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not have
jurisdiction.43 Rasul summarized: "Reading the phrase 'within their respective
jurisdictions' as used in the habeas statute to require the petitioners' presence with-
in the district court's territorial jurisdiction, the Court [in Ahrens] held that the
District of Columbia court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the detainees' claims.""
The Eisentrager petitioners were situated much like those in Ahrens. Their custody
was not within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia where the habeas corpus petitions were filed, and thus, that court did
not havejurisdiction under the habeas statute. Consequently, Eisentrager concluded
that the district court only had jurisdiction if the detainees had a constitutional right
to the writ, but Eisentrager held that they did not.45
to citizens abroad and still denied to aliens abroad: "The position that United States citizens
throughout the world may be entitled to habeas corpus rights [] is precisely the position that
this Court adopted in Eisentrager, even while holding that aliens abroad did not have habeas
corpus rights." Id. at 2708 (citation omitted). Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, noted
that "Justice Scalia appears to agree that neither the plain text of the [habeas] statute nor his
interpretation of that text provides a basis for treating American citizens differently from
aliens." Id. at 2696 n. 10 (emphasis omitted).
40 Id. at 2695.
4' Rasul noted that Eisentrager thoroughly discussed the constitutional right to the writ
and continued that Eisentrager "had far less to say on the questions of the petitioners'
statutory entitlement to habeas review. Its only statement on the subject was a passing
reference to the absence of statutory authorization: 'Nothing in the text of the Constitution
extends such a right, nor does anything in our statutes."' Id. at 2694 (quoting 339 U.S. 763,
768 (1950)).
42 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
43 id. at 193.
44 124 S. Ct. at 2694.
45 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777.
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Subsequent to Eisentrager, however, the Court interpreted the habeas statute
differently. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court4 6 held that a district court could
have habeas jurisdiction even when the prisoner was not present in the court's
jurisdiction. Rasul summarized Braden's holding:
[C]ontrary to Ahrens .... the prisoner's presence within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction ... is not "an invariable prerequisite" to the
exercise of district court jurisdiction under the federal habeas
statute. Rather, because the "writ of habeas corpus does not act
upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who
holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody," a district
court acts "within [its] respective jurisdiction" within the
meaning of § 2241 as long as "the custodian can be reached by
service of process."47
Thus, even if aliens abroad do not have a constitutional right to habeas corpus,
the statute as now interpreted gives them a right to petition for habeas relief.
Ultimately, Rasul's analysis indicates that the crucial question is not the status of
the foreign territory where alien detainees are held, but whether the district court
has jurisdiction over their custodians. The preliminary issue ofjurisdiction is easily
resolved, as Rasul indicated when it concluded that the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia had jurisdiction over the habeas claims: "Petitioners contend
that they are being held in federal custody in violation of the laws of the United
States. No party questions the District Court's jurisdiction over petitioners' custo-
dians. Section 2241, by its terms, requires nothing more."4
If this is all that is necessary for habeas jurisdiction, then the nationality of a
person held as an enemy combatant does not matter, nor does the place of confine-
ment. The Court's discussion of the Guantanamo Bay lease was unnecessary, as
was the discussion of how the facts of Eisentrager and Rasul differed. 49 A person
46 410 U.S. 484(1973).
47 124 S. Ct. at 2695 (quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at 494-95) (alterations in original). Rasul
continued: "Braden thus established that Ahrens can no longer be viewed as establishing 'an
inflexible jurisdictional rule,' and is strictly relevant only to the question of the appropriate
forum, not to whether the claim can be heard at all." id. (quoting Braden, 410 U.S. at
499-500).
41 Id. at 2698 (citations omitted).
41 Justice Kennedy, concurring in Rasul, distinguished Eisentrager. Id. at 2699-2701
(Kennedy, J., concurring). He first stressed that for practical purposes Guantanamo "belongs"
to the United States. Id. at 2700. He also noted the Eisentrager petitioners were tried and
convicted by military tribunals, but that the indefinite detention of the Rasul petitioners
"suggests a weaker case of military necessity and much greater alignment with the traditional
function of habeas corpus." Id. Justice Kennedy concluded:
In light of the status of Guantanamo Bay and the indefinite pretrial
1139
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held anywhere by the United States as an enemy combatant can challenge the
legality of his detention" as long as the district court where the habeas petition is
filed has jurisdiction over the detainee's custodian or over a supervisory official of
that custodian."' In other words, after Rasul, all individuals detained as enemy
combatants have the right of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their
incarceration. 2
But while the geographical site of the detention may not matter in determining
whether federal courts have jurisdiction to consider a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, 3 geography still may be important. It may affect the substance of the claims
a detainee can bring.
detention of the detainees, I would hold that federal-court jurisdiction
is permitted in these cases. This approach would avoid creating auto-
matic statutory authority to adjudicate the claims of persons located
outside the United States, and remains true to the reasoning of
Eisentrager.
Id. at 2701.
'0 Cf. id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Today's opinion.., extends the habeas statute,
for the first time, to aliens held beyond the sovereign territory of the United States and
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of its courts.").
" In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004), decided the same day as Rasul, the
Court noted that citizens held abroad are entitled to seek habeas corpus relief. "In such cases,
we have allowed the petitioner to name as respondent a supervisory official and file the
petition in the district where the respondent resides." Id. at 2725 n.16. Because Rasul
concludes that for jurisdictional purposes the habeas statute treats aliens and citizens alike,
aliens, too, should be able to name supervisory officials as respondents and file petitions in
the districts where the officials reside. See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
12 In concluding, however, the Rasul opinion stressed that the Court was deciding a
limited issue:
What is presently at stake is only whether the federal courts have
jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive's potentially
indefinite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of
wrongdoing. Answering that question in the affirmative, we reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for the District Court to
consider in the first instance the merits of petitioners' claims.
Id. at 2699.
" Geography does not bar detainees from obtaining relief in the Supreme Court of Israel.
The President of the Supreme Court of Israel gave the following description of the scope of
the court's jurisdiction:
Our Supreme Court - which in Israel serves as the court of first
instance for complaints against the executive branch - opens its doors
to anyone with a complaint about the activities of a public authority.
Even if the terrorist activities occur outside Israel or the terrorists are
being detained outside Israel, we recognize our authority to hear the
issue.
Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 153 (2002).
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II. SUBSTANTIVE CLAIMS OF HABEAS PETITIONS
A. Constitutional Rights of Aliens
The site of the detention abroad may still matter for a habeas corpus petition
because aliens not present in American territories generally do not have rights under
the U.S. Constitution.54 Aliens are entitled to constitutional protections only if they
have had a presence in the United States."
An issue still to be decided is whether Guantanamo Bay should be treated as
American territory for the purposes of constitutional rights. Rasul's discussion of
Guantanamo's special status seems to imply, without explicitly stating, that
position.56 If constitutional rights do apply there because it is the equivalent of
American territory, then aliens detained there are entitled to constitutional pro-
tections, including the right of due process. Because the Fifth Amendment's Due
" See Torruella, supra note 27, at 677 n. 173 ("Outside of the United States, non-U.S.
citizens have few, if any, rights under the U.S. constitution."); cf Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("It is well established that certain constitutional protections available
to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic
borders.").
" See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text; see also Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893).
[A]liens residing in the United States for a shorter or longer time, are
entitled, so long as they are permitted by the government of the United
States to remain in the country, to the safeguards of the Constitution,
and to the protection of the laws, in regard to their rights of person and
of property, and to their civil and criminal responsibility.
Id. An alien, even one here illegally, can be punished for a crime only if he has been afforded
the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S.
228 (1896); cf Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that aliens are entitled
to equal protection of the laws). An alien, even one here illegally, can be expelled or de-
ported from the country only after having been afforded due process. Shaughnessy v. United
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) ("[A]liens who have once passed through our
gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional
standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law."); accord The Japanese Immigrant
Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903). A foreign corporation can have its property situated in
the United States seized by the government only if the government complies with the Fifth
Amendment. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) ("The
[Russian Corporation] was an alien friend, and as such was entitled to the protection of the
Fifth Amendment. Exerting by its authorized agent the power of eminent domain in taking
the [corporation's] property, the United States became bound to pay just compensation.")
(citations omitted).
56 Justice Kennedy, concurring, seemed to make that point when he concluded: "From a
practical perspective, the indefinite lease of Guantanamo Bay has produced a place that
belongs to the United States, extending the 'implied protection' of the United States to it."
Rasul, 124 S. Ct at 2700 (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950)).
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Process Clause makes no distinction between citizens and aliens,57 alien detainees
should be entitled to the same due process as citizens held at Guantanamo."
The process due, however, is not clear in light of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, which was
decided the same day as Rasul. The United States had taken Yasir Esam Hamdi,
an American citizen, into custody in Afghanistan as a result of our military action
there. Hamdi was held as an enemy combatant and was first transferred to
Guantanamo and then to naval brigs in the United States. The plurality opinion in
Hamdi concluded that the executive had the authority to detain a citizen as an
"enemy combatant" but that Hamdi was entitled to due process in challenging his
classification as an enemy combatant.59 The Court stated, "We therefore hold that
a citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant
must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity
to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker."6 The
plurality opinion then went on to suggest that this due process requirement could
be satisfied with procedures that might not ordinarily satisfy the Fifth Amendment
but could do so in that instance because of the exigencies of a continuing military
conflict.6 Thus, a proper hearing might permit the executive to present hearsay
evidence that could be presumed correct as long as the detainee has a fair
opportunity to rebut the evidence.62 The opinion further suggested the "possibility"
that such a hearing could be held before "an appropriately authorized and properly
'7 The Fifth Amendment states, "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
58 Cf Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 ("[O]nce an alien enters the country, the legal cir-
cumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
permanent.").
59 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2648 (2004).
60Id.
6' The Court in Hamdi stated:
[T]he exigencies of the circumstances may demand that ... enemy
combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon
potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.
Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable
available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding. Like-
wise, the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in favor
of the Government's evidence, so long as that presumption remained
a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided. Thus,
once the Government puts forth credible evidence that the habeas
petitioner meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift to
the petitioner to rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that
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constituted military tribunal."63 Finally, the opinion concluded that Hamdi "unques-
tionably has the right to access to counsel in connection with the proceedings on
remand. ' Remand, however, was back to the lower federal court for further
consideration of the habeas petition, and while the Hamdi plurality stated that the
detainee can have counsel there, it said nothing about whether he would be entitled
to counsel at the suggested military tribunal hearing.
Thus, just as with lower courts considering the detentions of citizens as enemy
combatants, lower courts considering the detentions of aliens as enemy combatants
will have to flesh out what process is due (if any) in the determination of whether
a detainee is an enemy combatant. They will have to transform the Hamdi
plurality's suggestions into concrete evidentiary standards and burden of proof
requirements. If military tribunals are used for the classification, it will have to be
determined whether military tribunals can satisfy due process as suggested, and if
so, whether specific tribunals have been "appropriately authorized and properly
constituted.- 65 And when tribunals are used, lower courts will have to determine
the detainees' right to counsel.
B. Rights for Aliens Classified Outside Guantanamo
If a citizen were classified as an enemy combatant outside American territory
and then transferred to the United States for detention, that classification process
would have to satisfy due process because citizens are entitled to due process from
the government no matter where the government acts.66 In contrast, an alien without
63 id. at 2651.
64 Id. at 2652.
65 Id. at 2651.
' The Hamdi plurality indicated that a citizen was entitled to due process no matter
where he was first detained. Without any qualification, the opinion stated that "due process
demands some system for a citizen detainee to refute his classification." Id. The Court stated
that the citizen detainee must have the opportunity "to rebut the Government's factual
assertions before a neutral decisionmaker." Id. at 2648.
The opinion allows an initial detention before a due process hearing; thus, battlefield
decisions to detain are authorized. Id. at 2649. Only after "the determination is made to
continue to hold those who have been seized," is the detainee entitled to a due process hear-
ing to rebut the executive's assertion that he is an enemy combatant. Id.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissenting in Hamdi, concluded that the go-
vernment could not detain Hamdi as an enemy combatant but could only detain him as part
of a criminal process with all the rights an accused has in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 2673
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that his conclusion applied "only to citizens,
accused of being enemy combatants, who are detained within the territorial jurisdiction of
a federal court.... Where the citizen is captured outside and held outside the United States,
the constitutional requirements may be different." Id. Justice Scalia gave no support to justify
such differential treatment. Justice O'Connor, for the plurality, noted that "Justice Scalia can
point to no case or other authority for the proposition that those captured on a foreign
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already existing ties to the United States is not entitled to due process for depri-
vations of liberty that occur outside American territory.6 7 This geographical
distinction might limit the claims of illegal detention that aliens can bring, even
though they are incarcerated on American soil.
Thus, the capture of an alien in Afghanistan and his designation there as an
enemy combatant does not violate any of his constitutional rights as long as he is
incarcerated outside America or its equivalent. He lacks the necessary presence in
the United States to trigger any of his constitutional rights. How, if at all, does the
situation change because the detainee is transferred after capture and designation
to the naval base in Cuba? In other words, if the enemy-combatant classification
of an alien is made outside American territory, does the classification have to satisfy
due process because the detention that results is on United States soil or its
equivalent?
Superficially, the situation seems akin to the "normal" habeas petition of an
American prisoner serving a criminal sentence who claims that his custody is illegal
not for governmental actions at the prison, but for actions in the criminal process
that resulted in his incarceration. That "normal" habeas differs, however, in that the
criminal proceeding that leads to the imprisonment occurs in the United States,
where the petitioner, whether citizen or alien, is entitled to constitutional rights. In
contrast, the designation as an enemy combatant outside American territory, no
matter what the process, does not deny the alien constitutional rights. A question,
then, for the courts is whether a detention in American territory that results from a
process that did not, and did not have to, afford due process violates an alien
detainee's constitutional rights.
C. Substantive Claims for Aliens Without Constitutional Rights
This discussion has assumed that alien detainees at Guantanamo Bay have
constitutional rights because, in effect, Guantanamo is American territory. This
might not be so; courts still have to decide whether aliens are entitled to constitu-
tional rights there. Accepted doctrine, however, says that aliens outside U.S.
territory do not have rights under the U.S. Constitution, and whether or not consti-
tutional rights are enforced on Guantanamo, aliens held abroad elsewhere do not
have such rights.68 This doctrine, at least at first glance, makes Rasul's broad
conclusion that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions from
aliens in U.S. custody anywhere appear senseless. Aliens captured, classified as
enemy combatants, and incarcerated outside of U.S. territory do not have due
battlefield (whether detained there or in U.S. territory) cannot be detained outside the
criminal process." Id. at 2643 (emphasis omitted).
67 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
68 See supra Part II.B.
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process or other constitutional rights to assert, whether in a habeas corpus petition
or otherwise, so it hardly matters that they can file habeas petitions.
In considering what, if any, claims such aliens can bring, some implications of
the doctrine that aliens abroad are without U.S. constitutional rights should be
considered. The doctrine implies that the United States can kill, maim, and im-
prison aliens abroad, and destroy and seize their property not just during a war, but
at any time, for any purpose, without violating any of their constitutional rights. If
the United States, for whatever reason, seizes an Italian's yacht in the Adriatic Sea,
that Italian's rights under the U.S. Constitution would not have been violated. If the
United States decided to move an indigenous people out of a foreign rain forest to
further U.S. corporate development or for any other reason, those people would not
have constitutional rights to assert. If this country decided that it would kill every
third Indonesian in Indonesia, the killed and threatened would not have had their
U.S. constitutional rights violated.
The doctrine that aliens are without U.S. constitutional rights abroad has been
most often enunciated in immigration matters when aliens have sought entry into
the United States.69 Landon v. Plasencia70 summarized the law and reasons for it:
"This Court has long held that an alien seeking initial admission to the United States
requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for
the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative. 71
Of course, there are important differences between the immigrant situation and
the hypothesized raining of death, destruction, and confiscation by the United States
on aliens abroad. The alien attempting entry seeks a privilege from the United
States that it is under no duty to grant; part of the essence of sovereignty is that a
state can determine who can enter its domain. On the other hand, if the president
ordered the military simply to kill, rape, or imprison every alien in a foreign coun-
try, those killed, raped, or imprisoned would not simply be denied some privilege
by the United States. Instead, they would be deprived, through U.S. actions, of
69 Cf. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ('The distinction between an alien
who has effected an entry into the United States and one who has never entered runs
throughout immigration law."); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding
Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1300 (2002) ("[Djeferential re-
view of federal distinctions between citizens and aliens, or between aliens who are nationals
of one country and those who are nationals of another, has its roots in the wide berth accord-
ed the political branches 'in the area of immigration and naturalization."' (quoting Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82 (1976))).
70 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
71 Id. at 32. On the other hand, the Court has also indicated that perhaps the government
must still provide due process when excluding an alien on initial entry, but that constitutional
concept has little meaning in this context. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,
338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) ("Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.").
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what is surely a basic human right, whatever its source - the right not to be
wantonly deprived of life and liberty. And such governmental actions would not
be actions of accepted sovereignty. We, of course, recognize that other nations can
exclude Americans from their countries, but we surely do not believe that
sovereignty allows other countries arbitrarily to kill and imprison Americans in the
United States.
An alien seeking entry into the United States may be differently situated from
an alien deprived of liberty as an enemy combatant, but the absence of rights for
aliens abroad is general and not restricted to would-be immigrants. For example,
in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,7 2 the majority opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist "rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights
outside the sovereign territory of the United States."73 Rasul may have indicated
that all aliens abroad are entitled to challenge the legality of their detentions by the
United States in American courts, but it did not suggest a substantive doctrinal
change that would grant constitutional rights to aliens outside U.S. territory.
On the other hand, the notion that the executive can arbitrarily deprive anyone,
including aliens abroad, of life and liberty seems contrary to U.S. constitutional and
other traditions. Before concluding that Rasul extended an empty platter to those
held as enemy combatants outside the United States - they are entitled to petition
for a writ of habeas corpus but cannot get relief because they have no constitutional
rights to be violated74 - lower courts should carefully examine whether there are
other restraints on executive actions that such aliens can assert. An answer lies in
the separation-of-powers doctrine that lower courts will have to consider.
72 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
71 Id. at 269. Verdugo-Urquidez held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a
search and seizure by U.S. officials of property owned by a nonresident alien and located in
a foreign country. Id. The Court relied on Eisentrager, stating that "our rejection of extra-
territorial application of the Fifth Amendment was emphatic." Justice Rehnquist then quoted
the earlier case:
Such extraterritorial application of organic law would have been so
significant an innovation in the practice of governments that, if intend-
ed or apprehended, it could scarcely have failed to excite contemporary
comment. Not one word can be cited.... None of the learned com-
mentators on our Constitution has ever hinted at it. The practice of
every modem government is opposed to it.
Id. (quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 784) (quotations omitted). At issue in Eisentrager were
the rights of nationals of a hostile country in a declared war, and Eisentrager's holding was
more limited than the quoted language: "We hold that the Constitution does not confer a right
of personal security or an immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien enemy
engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the United States." 339 U.S. at
785.
" See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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D. Congressionally Authorized Detentions of Enemy Combatants
The Constitution divides the war powers between the President and Congress.
The President is, of course, commander in chief of the U.S. Army and Navy,75 and
more generally, has the "executive power."76 In addition, the Constitution imposes
on the president the duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed.""
Congress, on the other hand, has the authority to raise and maintain the army and
navy and to provide the rules for regulating land and naval forces." Most important
to the issue here, Congress is authorized "[t]o declare war... and make rules con-
cerning captures on land and water"79 and has the power "[t]o define and punish...
offences against the law of nations."80
Congress, not the President, is specifically given the legislative power to make
rules about those captured during military actions and to define what violates the
law of nations.8' The executive's role is to administer and execute what Congress
has authorized. As the Court summarized during World War II, the President is
vested with the constitutional power during a war "to carry into effect all laws
passed by Congress... defining and punishing offences against the law of nations,
including those which pertain to the conduct of war."82 A starting question, then,
is whether Congress has authorized the detention by the executive of aliens as
enemy combatants who are captured as the result of the U.S. military campaign in
Afghanistan. The Supreme Court's answer to that surely would be "yes."
As already noted, the Hamdi plurality, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, and
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Breyer, found that the
congressional joint resolution authorized the detention of U.S. citizens as enemy
combatants. Justice Thomas, dissenting, stated that "[a]lthough the President very
well may have inherent authority to detain those arrayed against our troops, I agree
with the plurality that we need not decide that question because Congress has
authorized the President to do so."83 A majority of the Court, then, has indicated
that U.S. citizens can be lawfully detained as enemy combatants, and if citizens can
be so detained, then surely so can aliens. Hamdi, however, did not fully resolve a
crucial question that will confront lower courts: What is the definition of an "enemy
combatant?"
71 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.
76 Id. § 1, cl. 1.
77 Id. § 3.
78 Id. at art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 12, 14.
" Id. at cl. 11.
80 Id. at cl. 10.
81 Id. atcls. 10, 11.
82 Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942).
83 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2679 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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E. The Unresolved Definition of "Enemy Combatant"
Hamdi indicates that neutral decision makers will have to determine whether
there is sufficient proof to detain a person as an enemy combatant. Just as a court
or a jury cannot decide whether someone committed a murder without a definition
of "murder," whoever reviews an enemy-combatant classification, whether ajudge
or a tribunal member, needs a definition of "enemy combatant" to make the
determination. "Enemy combatant," however, is not self-defining, and no accepted
definition of the concept exists. Indeed, apparently no real attempt to formulate a
definition has been attempted. Hamdi noted:
[Tihe Government has never provided any court with the full
criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as such. It has
made clear, however, that, for the purposes of this case, the
"enemy combatant" that it is seeking to detain is an individual
who, it alleges, was "part of or supporting forces hostile to the
United States or coalition partners" in Afghanistan and who
"engaged in an armed conflict against the United States" there.84
The Hamdi plurality, in determining that the President could detain citizens as
enemy combatants, restricted itself to those who fell within that definition 8 but it
also indicated the possibility of an acceptable broader definition: "The permissible
bounds of the [enemy-combatant] category will be defined by the lower courts as
subsequent cases are presented to them." 6
In fact, President Bush has not restricted himself to the narrow definition
presented in Hamdi. The President classified Jose Padilla as an enemy combatant
without asserting that Padilla had engaged in an armed conflict in Afghanistan
against the United States8" and therefore without claiming that Padilla satisfied the
second prong of the Hamdi definition.
The Hamdi plurality seems to envision a definition evolving through common-
law development. The President will detain on criteria he devises, and as courts
review the detentions, the boundaries of what constitutes an enemy combatant will
emerge. This process, however, raises a separation-of-powers issue that needs to
be addressed; it gives no role for Congress even though Congress, not the President
or the courts, is granted the constitutional authority to make rules for captures
Id. 2639 (quoting Brief for the Respondents at 3, Hamdi (No. 03-6696)).
85 See id. ("We therefore answer only the narrow question before us: whether the deten-
tion of citizens falling within that definition is authorized.").
86 Id. at 2642 n.1.
" See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715-16 n.2 (2004).
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arising from armed conflicts. 88 Hamdi concluded that Congress had authorized the
detentions of enemy combatants.89 Courts cannot, it would seem, simply determine
the boundaries of the definition as courts might in ordinary common-law adjudi-
cation, such as traditional judicial determinations of what constitutes a tort. Instead,
the courts have to decide whether the criteria used by the President are authorized
by Congress. That is not an easy determination because Congress has not directly
addressed the issue; no congressional statute or resolution defines "enemy com-
batant." Instead, the Hamdi plurality indicated that Congress had authorized the
detention of those who can be detained under the law of war.9" The difficulty here
is that the content of the law of war is unclear, as Professor George Fletcher
observes:
No one quite knows what the term "law of war" means. We do
assume that the law of war is part of the law of nations and
Congress has authority to define "Offenses against the Law of
Nations," which means that Congress could define the law of
war. There was a time when Congress took this task seriously,
but since World War II, it has largely ignored the field.9'
If courts decide that Congress authorized the detention of "enemy combatants"
as authorized by the law of war, the courts will have to make zen-like decisions
about how Congress has defined the law of war when Congress has not actually
done so. In any event, the concept will be indeterminate until courts have spoken.
Another issue raised is that a potential detainee may have no advance notice
that his conduct could result in incarceration as an enemy combatant. The Hamdi
plurality said that a due process hearing had to give notice to the detainee, but that
was merely notice of the factual basis for the classification.92 Normal notions of
due process might be thought to require something more - notice in advance of
conduct that the behavior could lead to detention. Certainly that is true for the
88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 10, 11.
89 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640-41.
90 It is a clearly established principle of the law of war that detention
may last no longer than active hostilities....
... [W]e understand Congress' grant of authority for the use of
"necessary and appropriate force" to include the authority to detain for
the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on
longstanding law-of-war principles.
See id. at 2641.
9' George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Contradictions in the Proposed Military
Tribunals, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 635, 650 (2002) (citation omitted).
92 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648.
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criminal process9 3 The Ex Post Facto Clause,94 which forbids retroactive definitions
to justify imprisonments, only applies to criminal matters, 95 and enemy-combatant
detentions are not criminal matters. But the issue still remains whether due process
permits such detentions based on retroactive definitions.
F. Authorized Detentions Under the Law of War
The Hamdi plurality concluded that Congress authorized the detention of those
who fought against the United States in Afghanistan because such detentions are a
"fundamental and accepted ... incident to war," and because of the plurality's
"understanding... [of] longstanding law-of-war principles."96 The Court has only
authorized detentions that the law of war accepts as legal.97 Other kinds of deten-
tions, then, may be illegal and grounds for habeas corpus relief.
The Supreme Court has so far only recognized two kinds of legal detentions of
enemy combatants. Exparte Quirin,98 decided during World War 1H, concluded that
under the law of war, "[1]awful combatants are subject to capture and detention as
prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise
subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punish-
ment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful."99
Alien combatants can be lawfully incarcerated as prisoners of war (POWs).
POWs are those who fall into their enemy's hands while legally fighting under the
laws of war. ° International law requires humane treatment for POWs, including
housing comparable to that provided for the forces of the detaining power in the
area and the right of the prisoner to write to his family. A POW does not have to
give information other than name, rank, date of birth, and serial number or an
equivalent. A POW cannot be subjected to any coercive interrogation.' ' The
President, however, did not detain those captured in Afghanistan as prisoners of war
" See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (finding no fair warning that
conduct violated a trespass statute when a court decision subsequent to the conduct inter-
preted the statute for the first time as including the conduct).
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
" Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386, 390, 396 (1798).
96 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640-41.
9 See id.
98 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
" Id. at 31. The Court went on to conclude that the acts committed by the petitioners
made them unlawful combatants: "[T]hose who during time of war pass surreptitiously from
enemy territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of
hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have the status of unlawful combatants."
Id. at 35.
'0o Elsea, supra note 28.
'0' See Torruella, supra note 18, at 697 n.259 for a summary of authorized treatment of
prisoners of war.
1150
RASUL V. BUSH: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
and has apparently held them incommunicado, housed them in prison-like
conditions, and subjected them to extensive interrogations. 112
The President has apparently determined that those captured are not lawful
belligerents entitled to prisoner-of-war status.'0 3 Captured members of militias and
organized resistance movements are entitled to be treated as POWs if they are
"commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;" wear a uniform or
"hav[e] a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; ... carry[] arms openly;"
and conduct themselves "in accordance with the laws and customs of war."'04
The President has not formally stated why the detainees are not treated as
prisoners of war. This could be because the captured combatants were not fighting
under a qualifying command structure or because they were not openly fighting in
distinctive garb that indicated their combatant status. International law also pro-
vides, however, that if there is "any doubt" whether a detainee is a prisoner of war,
then a "competent tribunal" must resolve the issue. 5 The President has, therefore,
"implicitly conclud[ed] that there is no doubt as to the status of any of the detain-
ees."' 1 6 Others, however, have questioned this certitude. For example, Professors
Katyal and Tribe state:
In circumstances in which persons "on the approach of the
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading
forces,"... the requirement of recognizable military uniforms is
relaxed under international law. This would suggest that some
of those fighting on behalf of the Taliban in Afghanistan - and
thus some whose status the President has been unwilling to re-
solve on an individualized basis... - might in fact qualify as
lawful belligerents and be entitled to relief on habeas corpus
from detention other than as prisoners of war with all of the
protections that flow from that status. 1°7
102 See Catherine Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the U.S.
"War on Terrorism", 5 THEORETICAL INQurRIES L. 47, 56 (2004). Powell reports that, as of
October 10, 2002, 598 prisoners were detained on Guantanamo and that "the justification for
the detention is to interrogate the prisoners (for intelligence-gathering regarding the
September 11 th attacks and any planned future attacks) and incapacitate them from com-
mitting future attacks." Id.
'0' See id. at 58 ("[T]he Bush Administration has made a blanket determination that all
the detainees are illegal combatants.., and are therefore not entitled to POW status.").
04 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art.
4, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320-22, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138.
105 Id. at art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3324, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140-42.
106 Powell, supra note 102, at 58.
'07 Katyal & Tribe, supra note 69, at 1264 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 104, at art. 4(a), 6 U.S.T. at 3324, 75 U.N.T.S.
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If Congress has only authorized detentions that conform to accepted law-of-war
practices and congressional authorization is required for the detentions, then lower
courts may have to determine whether detainees are legally held without prisoner-
of-war status.108
G. Illegal Combatants
Enemy combatants can not only be validly held as prisoners of war, but they
also can be validly held, as Ex parte Quirin recognized, as illegal enemy comba-
tants."° Eight men during World War H infiltrated the United States to commit
sabotage on behalf of Germany."' After their capture, the President appointed a
military commission to try them for actions violating the laws of war." 1 They
contended in a habeas corpus petition that "the President is without any statutory
or constitutional authority to order the petitioners to be tried by military tribunal.""
2
The Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin, however, held that Congress, by enacting
Article 15 of the Articles of War, had authorized such trials by military tribunals." 3
at 138-40) (footnotes omitted); cf Torruella, supra note 27, at 696-97 (quoting Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August, 1949, and Relating to the Protections
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature Dec.
12, 1977, pt. I, art. I, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609). Professor Torruella states:
[T]he fighting elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and possibly
also those of al Qaida, could be considered rebel or insurgent groups
under Protocol II of the Geneva Convention, as "organized armed
groups which, under responsible command, exercis[ing] ... control
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement [the Protocol]." As
such they are entitled to certain protections.
Id. (alterations in original); see also Elsea, supra note 28, at 15 ("Members of al Qaida
captured in Afghanistan may be entitled to POW or civilian status, depending upon the
circumstances of their capture.").
,08 See United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 796 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("[Tlhe Court
believes that the question of prisoner of war status properly presented can be decided by the
Court ...."), afftd, 117 F.3d 1206 (1 1th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1060 (1998).
'09 317 U.S. 1, 35 (1942).
1 Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 22.
2 d. at 24.
"3 Id. at 28. Then Article 15 of Articles of War, now codified at 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000),
stated:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-
martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or other
military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders
or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military
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The Court stated, "By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has
explicitly provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals
shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appro-
priate cases.""' 4 Ex parte Quirin then went on to hold that the military tribunal
trials did not violate the Constitution.'15 And the Court has reaffirmed in both In
re Yamashita' 6 and Johnson v. Eisentrager'"7 that enemy combatants can be tried
for violating the law of war by military tribunals authorized by Congress."1 8
Thus, it might be concluded that Congress has authorized trials for actions of
illegal combatants before presidentially-appointed military tribunals. The aliens at
Guantanamo, however, were not afforded such trials. Instead, they were held
without prisoner-of-war status and without any kind of trial. The question, then, is
whether aliens can be indefinitely held without trials as illegal combatants solely
on the executive's determination. Citizens, and presumably at least those aliens
entitled to constitutional rights, are entitled to a due process hearing as to whether
they are enemy combatants." 9 Are they entitled to due process in the determination
that they are illegal enemy combatants? In other words, if a constitutionally proper
hearing determines that a person is an enemy combatant, can the president alone
determine then that the person is an illegal combatant? The Supreme Court has not
explicitly addressed the issue, but because an illegal-combatant determination can
bring a greater deprivation of liberty than just an enemy-combatant determination,
the illegal-combatant classification would seem to require due process for those
entitled to constitutional rights.
commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.
Id.
114 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28. Ex pane Quirin also stated, "Congress has incorporated by
reference, as within the jurisdiction of military commissions, all offenses which as defined
as such by the law of war, and which may constitutionally be included within that juris-
diction." Id. at 30 (citation omitted).
15 We conclude that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not restrict
whatever authority was conferred by the Constitution to try offenses
against the law of war by military commission, and that petitioners,
charged with such an offense not required to be tried by jury at
common law, were lawfully placed on trial by the Commission without
a jury.
Id. at 45.
1'6 327 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1946).
117 339 U.S. 763, 786 (1950).
118 Ex parte Quirin also stated, "It is unnecessary for present purposes to determine to
what extent the President as Commander in Chief has constitutional power to create military
commissions without the support of Congressional legislation. For here Congress has
authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions." 317 U.S. at 29.
19 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635.
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Furthermore, if the president needs congressional authorization to indefinitely
detain illegal combatants without a trial, he may not have such authority. Ex parte
Quirin did state that illegal combatants were "subject to capture and detention,"' 120
but the issue in that case was the legality of the military tribunal trials, not the
capture and detention prior to the trial. 2 ' Of course, because the trials were
authorized by Congress, Congress must have also authorized the necessary corollary
powers to have the trials, and the president had to be authorized to capture and
detain those combatants whom the president determined violated the laws of war
in order to try them. Exparte Quirin, thus, seemed to be speaking of detention only
in order to have a trial, not indefinite detentions without a trial.'22 At best it can be
said that the Court has never decided whether Congress has authorized indefinite
detentions simply on the president's determination. There were no indefinite
detentions without trials in Quirin, Yanashita, and Eisentrager, where the Court
upheld the treatment of illegal combatants; instead, trials in front of military
tribunals were promptly held in those cases.
Significantly, in holding that Congress had authorized military tribunal trials,
the Court concluded that those authorized proceedings allowed the accused illegal
combatants to defend themselves. Yamashita expressly stated, "[W]e held in Ex
parte Quirin, as we hold now, that Congress by sanctioning trials of enemy aliens
by military commission for offenses against the law of war had recognized the right
of the accused to make a defense."' 123 The trials found legal in Quirin, Yamashita,
and Eisentrager were timely ones in which the aliens had lawyers, could challenge
the evidence against them, and could present evidence in their defense. Such
procedures were unnecessary if Congress had also authorized indefinite detentions
without trials and a defense. Indeed, by authorizing trials that allow for a mean-
ingful defense, the inference is that Congress was forbidding unchallengeable
indefinite detentions without trials. 1
24
20 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31.
... Id. at 18-19.
112 Cf. Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (holding that a Japanese-American, detained
in a "Relocation Center," had to be released). The Court noted that the removal of Japanese-
Americans from designated areas of the West Coast was authorized to prevent sabotage and
espionage. Id. at 300. Because the petitioner, even according to the President, was "a loyal
and law-abiding citizen," she could not be detained because her continuing detention did not
serve the purposes of the evacuation. Id. at 294. The Court stated, "When the power to detain
is derived from the power to protect the war effort against espionage and sabotage, detention
which has no relationship to that objective is unauthorized." Id. at 302. But see Hamdi, 124
S. Ct. at 2640 ("While Haupt was tried for violations of the law of war, nothing in Quirin
suggests that his citizenship would have precluded his mere detention for the duration of the
relevant hostilities.").
123 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 9 (citing Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24-25).
124 Cf WaLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALLTHELAWS BUT ONE: CIVILLIBERTIES IN WARTIME 50
(1998) ("[D]etention... without charges is more arbitrary than detention on charges to be
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Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality in Hamdi, did, however, suggest that
at least some indefinite detentions were not legal. 115 While she concluded that the
congressional joint resolution in the wake of September 11 authorized the detention
of citizens as enemy combatants, she also stated, "we agree that indefinite detention
for the purpose of interrogation is not authorized."' 12 6 Accordingly, such incar-
cerations can be constitutional only if the President has the inherent power to
indefinitely detain aliens as illegal combatants without trial, which is a question the
courts have so far not addressed.'27
tried before a tribunal."). Professors Kaytal and Tribe describe the limited power of the
President to create military tribunals:
Both the majority opinion and the Chase concurrence in [Ex Parte]
Milligan, [71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)] hold congressional authorization
to be at least a necessary requirement for [military] tribunals. This
general principle of Milligan - a principle never repudiated in subse-
quent cases - leaves the President little unilateral freedom to craft an
order to detain people on his own suspicion for indefinite warehousing
or trial at his pleasure in a system of military justice.
Katyal & Tribe, supra note 69, at 1279-81.
125 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641.
126 Id.
127 Cf Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). In holding that "the Constitution does
not confer a right of personal security or an immunity from military trial and punishment,"
id. at 785, on non-resident alien enemies, Eisentrager explained that non-resident alien
enemies were entitled to no more protection than resident enemies:
[R]esident enemy aliens are entitled only to judicial hearing to deter-
mine.., that they are really alien enemies. When that appears, those
resident here may be deprived of liberty by Executive action without
hearing. While this is preventive rather than punitive detention, no
reason is apparent why an alien enemy charged with having committed
a crime should have greater immunities from Executive action than one
who it is only feared might at some future time commit a hostile act.
Id. at 784 (citation omitted).
The President, however, has this summary power to deprive resident alien enemies of
their liberty under a statute passed as part of the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Act of July
6, 1798, ch. 66, § 1, 1 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 21 (2000)). This statute
remains in effect and authorizes the President to apprehend, restrain, and remove "natives,
citizens, denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government" when there is a declared
war or "invasion or predatory incursion" of the United States. Id.
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952), held that under limited circumstances the
President has the power to create military commissions to try criminal cases in territory
occupied by U.S. armed forces as part of a declared war. Madsen was tried in occupied
Germany for killing her husband, a lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force. Id. at 344-45. The Court
stated:
In the absence of attempts by Congress to limit the President's
power, it appears that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy
of the United States, he may, in time of war, establish and prescribe the
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H. Indefinite Detentions
Even without interrogation, indefinite detentions may at some point raise issues
that lower courts will have to address. The Hamdi plurality recognized that detain-
ing enemy combatants was an accepted part of war and that the purpose of the
detention is to prevent such belligerents from returning to battle.1 28 This purpose
ends when the hostilities cease, and "[i]t is a clearly established principle of the law
of war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities."'2 9 In a conventional
war, the end of fighting is usually relatively clear, but, as the Court recognized, the
end of the "war on terror" might never be apparent. The result could be a lifetime
detention. 130 The Hamdi plurality evinced concern with this possibility:
[W]e understand Congress' grant of authority for the use of
"necessary and appropriate force" to include the authority to
detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our under-
standing is based on longstanding law-of-war principles. If the
practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike
those of the conflicts that informed the development of the law
of war, that understanding may unravel.
13
'
Justice O'Connor explained that the Court did not have to address whether the law
of war had changed due to the unique nature of the armed conflict in the "war on
terrorism," as long as U.S. troops were still in active combat in Afghanistan.'32
jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions, and of tribunals in
the nature of such commissions, in territory occupied by Armed Forces
of the United States .... The policy of Congress to refrain from
legislating in this uncharted area does not imply its lack of power to
legislate.
Id. at 348-49.
128 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640.
129 Id. at 2641.
130 See id.
We recognize that the national security underpinnings of the "war on
terror," although crucially important, are broad and malleable.... If
the Government does not consider this unconventional war won for two
generations, and if it maintains during that time that Hamdi might, if
released, rejoin forces fighting against the United States, then the
position it has taken throughout the litigation of this case suggests that
Hamdi's detention could last for the rest of his life.
Id.
131 id.
132 Id. at 2642. Whether U.S. combat in Afghanistan is ongoing is an issue apparently to
be considered on remand in Hamdi. See id.
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L Determining the End of Active Hostilities
If the Hamdi plurality suggested that enemy combatants cannot be held after
active hostilities conclude, a major problem ensues: How is it to be determined
when active hostilities have ended? Hamdi gives no guidance on this point.
In a related context, the Court, in Ludecke v. Watkins,'33 indicated that the
President determines when a war ends. 3" Under the Alien Enemy Act, the President
can detain and remove resident enemy aliens from the country during a declared
war.' 3 5 A German citizen residing in the United States during World War II was
detained under this Act, and although Germany had unconditionally surrendered in
May 1945, the executive branch ordered his removal in January 1946.136 The Court
rejected his claim that the presidential power to remove him under the Act ceased
with the end of the actual hostilities: "War does not cease with a cease-fire order,
and power to be exercised by the President such as that conferred by the Act of
1798 is a process which begins when war is declared but is not exhausted when the
shooting stops."' 37 Congress could determine that a war has ended, but if it does not
speak, the President determines when a war concludes.' Justice Frankfurter,
writing for a unanimous Court, stated:
The political branch of the Government has not brought the
war with Germany to an end. On the contrary, it has proclaimed
that "a state of war still exists." ... These are matters of
political judgment for which judges have neither technical
competence nor official responsibility.
... Accordingly, we hold that full responsibility for the just
exercise of this great power may validly be left where the
3' 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
" Id. at 168 ("'The state of war' may be terminated by treaty or legislation or Presidential
proclamation.").
13 Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, § 1, 1 Stat. 577 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 21
(2000)).
136 Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 162-63.
137 Id. at 167.
I3' id. at 169 n.13.
Congress can, of course, provide either by a day certain or a defined
event for the expiration of a statute. But when the life of a statute is
defined by the existence of a war, Congress leaves the determination of
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Congress has constitutionally placed it - on the President of
the United States.
139
Past declared wars often concluded with a peace treaty, which presumably
marked the termination of the conflict. But undeclared wars rarely, if ever, produce
formal peace treaties. The conclusions of such wars, if they conclude at all, come
from no formal process, and if the President has not spoken to declare a war over,
that war might still be continuing. At least, there appears to be no way for the
judiciary to determine that a war is over."
The cessation of active hostilities is even more indeterminate than the end of
a war. If courts are not competent to determine the end of a war, they are even less
able to determine when active hostilities have ceased. Certainly Hamdi gave little
guidance on that issue, with the plurality indicating that such hostilities continued
"[i]f the record establishes that United States troops are still involved in active
combat in Afghanistan. ' ' '4 ' If, however, troops are present and the executive asserts
that active hostilities continue, there seems to be no way to rebut the assertion.
Even if U.S. troops have not been fired upon or initiated a military action for a
while, hostilities may merely be in a hiatus, not ended. More combat may ensue or
be anticipated. Without a formal cease-fire, the commander in chief normally
determines whether hostilities have ceased. If detentions cannot continue after the
end of active hostilities, courts will have to determine whether the judiciary merely
has to defer to the executive determination of when hostilities cease, or whether
courts can develop meaningful, judicially enforceable standards to decide when
detentions are no longer authorized because active hostilities have ceased.
J. The Norms of International Law
While aliens, via habeas corpus petitions, may be able to claim that their
detentions are illegal because their detentions were not authorized by Congress,
they may also be able to claim that their detentions are illegal because they violate
"3 Id. at 170, 173 (quoting Proclamation No. 2714, 12 Fed. Reg. 1 (Dec. 31, 1946)).
'4 See John Alan Cohan, Legal War: When Does It Exist, and When Does It End?, 27
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 301-03 (2004).
Although the Constitution provides that Congress has the power to
declare war, there is no provision regarding which branch has the
power to terminate war. It has been said that the determination of when
a war terminates is a far more difficult question to answer than when a
war starts. The general rule is that the end of a war is something
determined by the political branches of the government, such as by
presidential proclamation.
Id. at 301.
141 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2642.
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international law. Over a century ago, the Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana142
held that U.S. courts must enforce international law: "International law is part of
our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination." 143 During the Spanish-American War, a U.S.
naval blockade had seized a coastal fishing boat off the coast of Cuba.'" The Court
stated that under international law such vessels are exempt from seizure during a
war 45 and, because of that international law, ruled that the seizure was illegal.'46
Indeed, the Court in Ex parte Quirin extensively relied on its own conception
of international law for the conclusion that military tribunals could legally try the
German saboteurs. '47 The Court stated, "From the very beginning of its history this
Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part of the law
of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of
enemy nations as well as of enemy individuals."'48 The Court went on to conclude
that spies and others who come through military lines without uniforms to wage war
are not subject to prisoner-of-war status but are "offenders against the law of war
142 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
141 Id. at 700. The Court also went on to state:
In Brown v. United States, there are expressions of Chief Justice
Marshall which, taken by themselves, might seem inconsistent with the
position above maintained of the duty of a prize court to take judicial
notice of a rule of international law, established by general usage of
civilized nations, as to the kind of property subject to capture. But the
actual decision in that case, and the leading reasons on which it was
based, appear to us rather to confirm our position.
Id. at 710 (citation omitted). The Court in Habana conceded, however, that determining the
content of international law can be difficult.
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages
of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists
and commentators who by years of labor, research and experience,
have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of
which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not
for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to
be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
Id. at 700.
'44 Id. at 678-79.
145 Id. at 686 ("By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and
gradually ripening into a rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their
vocation of catching and bringing in fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt, with their
cargoes and crews, from capture as prize of war.").
146 Id. at 714.
147 See generally Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-43 (1942).
148 Id. at 27-28.
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subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals."'4 9 The Court again relied on
international law to conclude that a citizen could be treated as an enemy combatant:
"Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government,
and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are
enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of
war."
15 0
These precedents indicate that detainees can claim their detentions are illegal
because they violate international law.' 5' Lower courts would have to confront
questions similar to those raised under a due process analysis or in response to a
claim that Congress has not authorized a detention: How does international law
define "enemy combatant"? Who, under international law, is a prisoner of war?
Does international law define when active hostilities end? Under international law,
can enemy combatants be indefinitely imprisoned for violating the laws of war
without being afforded a timely, fair trial?
This separate analysis of international law might not be important if courts
determine that what Congress has authorized are only detentions that comport with
international law. If courts, however, determine that detentions are not congres-
sionally authorized, courts will then have to address whether the President has
inherent power without congressional authorization for the detentions. If the courts
were to find that the executive branch has such inherent power, then courts would
again have to address the content of the applicable international law and determine
how, if at all, it restrains executive actions.
In any event, whatever the context for assessing the law of war, courts seem to
be required to make decisions about international law. In doing so, courts should
have to consider that the relevant law-of-war principles were forged in response to
different kinds of conflicts from the present one, and this should perhaps affect the
assessment of what international law requires.
International law pertaining to captured combatants developed from
symmetrical wars that provided natural checks on the belligerents.' Symmetry
was present because each belligerent nation could expect to capture many enemy
combatants and could also expect to have many of its own soldiers captured. With
such balance, each nation, in determining how to treat those it captured, had to think
how its actions would affect the treatment of its own captured citizens; hence, a
149 id. at 31.
150 Id. at 37-38.
' Cf. Powell, supra note 102, at 57 ("Both U.S. domestic law and international law
forbid indefinite detention without trial in most contexts.").
152 See, e.g., Derek Jinks, Do We Need a New Legal Regime After September 11?:
Protective Parity and the Laws of War, 79 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1493 (2004) (discussing
the treatment and rights of different categories of captured combatants in customary and
treaty-induced international law).
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natural check was in place." 3 But now in Afghanistan and Iraq, and probably in
future conflicts, the United States fights asymmetrical actions where that check has
disappeared. We take hundreds or thousands into custody, but an organized enemy
army does not detain large numbers of U.S. soldiers. Executive decisions on how
to classify and keep these prisoners no longer have to weigh how an enemy nation
will treat thousands of captured Americans. This new face of war removes an
important check on the executive branch that helped shape international law.
Perhaps the traditional law of war needs re-examination.'- 4
The present conflict is asymmetrical in another way that might affect inter-
national law - the enemy is no longer a traditional state. While the invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq may look like traditional warfare, our enemy was not really
a country, but rather terrorist organizations and leaders. In the future, we can expect
not to battle traditional nation-states, but rather sub-national organizations or groups
that transcend traditional boundaries. Thomas Barnett, a military analyst, discusses
the rise of asymmetrical warfare and states that we have moved
away from warfare against states or even blocs of states and
toward a new era of warfare against individuals .... [I]n the
's3 While Germany's attempt to infiltrate saboteurs into the United States early during
World War II led to Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), Americans also captured German
saboteurs during the end of the war in a less well-known event. See Louis FISHER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., REPORT FOR CONGRESS: MILITARY TRIBuNALs: THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT
42 (2002), available at http://www.fas.orglirp/crs/RL31340.pdf. Secretary of War Henry
Stimson urged President Roosevelt to use different procedures to treat these enemies than had
been used in the past. Id. Among his arguments, Stimson contended that the use of earlier
methods "would be likely to lead to German maltreatment of American prisoners of war in
their hands." Id. The earlier procedures were modified. Id. at 42-44 (quoting Letter from
Henry Stimson to Frankin D. Roosevelt (Jan. 7, 1945)).
'-4 Cf. Thomas J. Lepri, Note, Safeguarding the Enemy Within: The Need for Procedural
Protections for U.S. Citizens Detained as Enemy Combatants Under Ex parte Quirin, 71
FORDHAM L. REv. 2565, 2573-74 (2003). During World War II
persons of low rank were responsible for making determinations that
a detainee was not entitled to prisoner-of-war status, and these
determinations were usually made with little deliberation. Such an
informal classification procedure ... may have worked in its context.
But an irregular conflict such as the "War on Terror" demands
something much more formal.
Id. Lepri points out that during the Vietnam War a more formal system was put in place. See
id. at 2274. A tribunal of at least three officers, requiring a majority vote, decided on
prisoner-of-war status if the detainee or someone on his behalf claimed such status. Id. The
detainee had a right to an interpreter, a right to be present, a right to counsel, and a right to
present evidence, including the right to call and cross-examine witnesses. Id. Counsel could
be anyone reasonably available, including another detainee. Id. If the detainee did not have
counsel, the tribunal would appoint a military lawyer for him. Id. This counsel could talk
privately with the detainee as well as with witnesses. Id.
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1970s we were still dealing with the "evil empire," while in the
1980s we downshifted to "evil states," and in the 1990s we
downshifted further to "evil leaders." [B]y the end of the cen-
tury it became clear that interstate wars had ... disappeared.
All that really leaves in the international system today is mass
violence within states and the terrorists that tend to emerge from
those endemic conflicts over time, like all those al Qaeda oper-
atives who cut their teeth on Afghanistan's internal violence." 5
To call our military actions against these new enemies "war" is to use that term
in a different way from past usage. This shift is indicated by the apparent position
of the United States that while we were legally fighting in Afghanistan, all those
opposing us there were illegal combatants. Otherwise, at least some of those
captured would have been granted prisoner-of-war status. This seems to constitute
a different conflict from a traditional war. Mark Tushnet has an explanation:
The already long duration of the "war on terrorism" sug-
gests that we ought not think of it as war in the sense that World
War I was a war. It is, perhaps, more like a condition than a
war - more like the war on cancer, the war on poverty, or, most
pertinently, the war on crime.156
Because it is more of a condition than a war, it will not have a true end. Instead,
like the war on crime, even significant changes in circumstances may not be
apparent when they occur. At what point is it evident that it is now safe to walk the
streets in a once crime-ridden neighborhood?
1 THOMAS P.M. BARNETT, THE PENTAGON'S NEW MAP: WAR AND PEACE IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 92-93 (2004).
156 Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003
Wis. L. REV. 273, 279. Tushnet continues: "To say that law is silent during a more-or-less
permanent condition is quite different from saying that law is silent during wartime." Id.; see
also Ackerman, supra note 31, at 1034.
For the criminal law purist, the "war on terrorism" is merely a
metaphor without decisive legal significance, more like the "war on
drugs" or the "war on crime" than the war against Nazi Germany. Al
Qaeda is a dangerous conspiracy, but so is the Mafia, whose activities
lead to the deaths of thousands through drug overdoses and gangland
murders. Conspiracy is a serious crime, and crime fighters have special
tools to deal with it. But nobody supposes that casual talk of a "war on
crime" permits us to sweep away the entire panoply of criminal pro-
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The condition of the "war on terror" does not have the demarcations of a war.
When did it start? When will it end? 157 Who is the enemy?15 8 How is the enemy
to be recognized? What is the enemy's command structure? Who is a neutral
country, and how should it be treated? What are appropriate military tactics? What
are appropriate interrogation techniques? In a traditional war, those questions,
while sometimes difficult, generally have answers, sometimes coming from
international law. The answers now, however, to these and many more questions,
are murky. Courts should address whether the law of war as it pertains to enemy
combatants, formulated for different kinds of armed conflicts than those now being
fought, needs modification for the present conditions.
K. Standing for Aliens Without Due Process Rights
The detentions of aliens, even for those without due process rights, may be
illegal because they are not congressionally authorized and not within the inherent
executive powers, or because they violate international law. The question remains
whether aliens without constitutional rights can raise such issues through a habeas
corpus petition. The answer, derived from the earlier military tribunal decisions,
appears to be "yes." In those cases, the Court found that it could not review the
correctness of a tribunal's decision. 159 The Court concluded, however, that it had
the power and duty to determine whether the tribunals were authorized to act and
that enemy aliens could raise that issue in a habeas petition. Thus, the Court in
Yamashita stated:
We consider here only the lawful power of the commission to
try the petitioner for the offense charged.
157 [T]here is no clear beginning or end to the conflict, meaning it feels as
if it has been around forever and that it will continue well past our
lifetimes. Think about the Middle East. When exactly did the hostilities
start there? Was it the late 1980s or early 1970s? Or was it when Israel
was created in 1948? Or how about the Crusades eight centuries ago?
BARNETT, supra note 155, at 119.
158 [Tlhe definition of the enemy changes over time. When the United
States went into Somalia in late 1992, at first the enemy was the chaos
that prevented relief workers from dealing with the famine. Then it
became the lack of a functioning central state. Then it became all those
warlords running around the place. Then we decided that it was one
warlord who was the real problem.
Id.
159 See, e.g., In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946) ("If the military tribunals have lawful
authority to hear, decide and condemn, their action is not subject to judicial review merely
because they have made a wrong decision on disputed facts.").
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... [Congress] has not foreclosed [enemy aliens'] right to
contend that the Constitution or the laws of the United States
withhold authority to proceed with the trial. It has not with-
drawn, and the Executive branch of the government could not,
unless there was suspension of the writ, withdraw from the
courts the duty and power to make such inquiry into the author-
ity of the commission as may be made by habeas corpus. 6°
If a court has the jurisdiction to decide whether a military tribunal created by
the executive can lawfully try an alien for being an illegal combatant, then the court
should also have the power and the duty to determine whether the President has the
lawful authority to detain aliens as enemy combatants without a trial. Furthermore,
just as the owner of The Paquete Habana could claim in American courts that the
seizure of his vessel violated international law,' aliens imprisoned as enemy
combatants should be able to claim that their detentions violate international law.
CONCLUSION
Rasul v. Bush allows aliens detained anywhere by the United States as enemy
combatants to seek habeas corpus relief in U.S. courts. Rasul, however, leaves
unanswered what substantive grounds aliens detained outside the United States can
raise to challenge their detentions. If Guantanamo Bay is treated as the equivalent
of U.S. territory, aliens detained there should be able to claim violations of due
process rights. Those held elsewhere should be able to claim that their detentions
are illegal because they have not been authorized by Congress, and are not within
the inherent powers of the President, and that they violate international law.
" Id. at 8-9; see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,788 (1950) ("It being within
the jurisdiction of a Military Commission to try the prisoners, it was for it to determine
whether the laws of war applied and whether an offense against them had been committed.").
161 See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
